

CLERK US DISTRICT COURT  
NORTHERN DIST. OF TX  
FILED

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT  
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS  
AMARILLO DIVISION

2017 OCT -4 PM 1:51

**DEPUTY CLERK**

CARLOS RIVAS,

Petitioner,

V.

2:17-CV-195

LORIE DAVIS, Director,  
Texas Department of Criminal Justice,  
Correctional Institutions Division,

**Respondent.**

**FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATION TO DENY  
PETITION FOR A WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS**

Petitioner has filed with this Court a Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus by a Person in State Custody. Petitioner is presently incarcerated at the Jordan Unit in Gray County, Texas pursuant to a conviction for several counts of the offense of aggravated sexual assault and the offense of indecency with a child out of the 175<sup>th</sup> Judicial District Court of Bexar County, Texas. *See State v. Rivas*, No. 2003CR10018. By his federal habeas application, petitioner challenges an April 11, 2017 prison disciplinary proceeding conducted at the Jordan Unit. *See Disciplinary* No. 201702231643. In his habeas application, petitioner acknowledges he is not eligible for release on mandatory supervision. *See Question 16.*

In order to challenge a prison disciplinary adjudication by way of a federal petition for a writ of habeas corpus, a petitioner must, at a minimum, be eligible for mandatory supervised release **and** have received a punishment sanction which included forfeiture of previously accrued

good-time credits. See *Malchi v. Thaler*, 211 F.3d 953, 958 (5th Cir. 2000). Review of the online Offender Information Detail maintained by the Texas Department of Criminal Justice confirms petitioner is incarcerated pursuant to several counts of aggravated sexual assault, and that his projected release date is his maximum sentence date of May 29, 2031. Since September 1, 1987, a prisoner serving a sentence for the offense of aggravated sexual assault is not eligible for mandatory supervised release. Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 42.18, §(8)(c)(6) (1987) (now Tex. Gov't Code § 508.149(a)(8) (2017)). As petitioner is not eligible for mandatory supervised release, he may not challenge a prison disciplinary proceeding by way of a federal petition for a writ of habeas corpus. See *Malchi*, 211 F.3d at 958. Petitioner's habeas application should be DENIED.

RECOMMENDATION

It is the RECOMMENDATION of the undersigned United States Magistrate Judge to the United States District Judge that the petition for a writ of habeas corpus filed by petitioner CARLOS RIVAS be DENIED.

INSTRUCTIONS FOR SERVICE

The United States District Clerk is directed to send a copy of these Findings, Conclusions and Recommendation to each party by the most efficient means available.

IT IS SO RECOMMENDED.

ENTERED this 4<sup>th</sup> day of October 2017.

  
LEE ANN RENO  
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

**\* NOTICE OF RIGHT TO OBJECT \***

Any party may object to these proposed findings, conclusions and recommendation. In the event parties wish to object, they are hereby NOTIFIED that the deadline for filing objections is fourteen (14) days from the date of filing as indicated by the “entered” date directly above the signature line. Service is complete upon mailing, Fed. R. Civ. P. 5(b)(2)(C), or transmission by electronic means, Fed. R. Civ. P. 5(b)(2)(E). **Any objections must be filed on or before the fourteenth (14th) day after this recommendation is filed** as indicated by the “entered” date. *See* 28 U.S.C. § 636(b); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(2); *see also* Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(d).

Any such objections shall be made in a written pleading entitled “Objections to the Findings, Conclusions and Recommendation.” Objecting parties shall file the written objections with the United States District Clerk and serve a copy of such objections on all other parties. A party’s failure to timely file written objections shall bar an aggrieved party, except upon grounds of plain error, from attacking on appeal the unobjected-to proposed factual findings, legal conclusions, and recommendation set forth by the Magistrate Judge and accepted by the district court. *See Douglass v. United Services Auto. Ass’n*, 79 F.3d 1415, 1428-29 (5th Cir. 1996) (en banc), superseded by statute on other grounds, 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), as recognized in *ACS Recovery Servs., Inc. v. Griffin*, 676 F.3d 512, 521 n.5 (5th Cir. 2012); *Rodriguez v. Bowen*, 857 F.2d 275, 276-77 (5th Cir. 1988).